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merchant banking, and private equity and venture capital, with firms like
CIBC, Bank of America, Chemical Bank, and even First Ontario Fund,
which is not noted in his bio, but is a labor-sponsored venture capital fund in
Canada. So I think he is in a good place to comment on the pros and cons of
that model of Government intervention. Brad specializes in small cap private
and early stage companies both as an advisor and principal. He has served on
a number of boards of directors and advisory boards for these companies.
Without any further ado, because I know Henry is getting a little
impatient, I am going to turn to Brad to start the discussion on the first
subject, the relationship of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs: the good,
the bad and the ugly.
CANADIAN SPEAKER
Brad D. Cherniak*
&

UNITED STATES SPEAKER
Cathy Horton-Panzica*
MR. CHERNIAK: Let me start by saying that when I heard about this
topic, I was actually quite excited to come here, because it is a topic quite
near and dear to my heart. When I started in my field, my first deal was $366
million, and my last deal in March was $5 million.., so either my career is
in inexorable decline or I made the strategic decision, which I like to think I
have, to focus on entrepreneurs and their companies - because I think it is a
very challenging and rewarding world, and it is a great place to spend a
career.
But I thought what we would do is discuss - first, can you hear me okay
in the back? Is my voice carrying? Okay. We thought we would delve into
the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs

. . .

and that we might as

well start with the dirt!
You know, if you are going to discuss a relationship, you want to start
with the bad side rather than the good side. So I'm here to give you the
straight goods - but, this being said, I have to say I feel a little bit duped and
misled by Daniel and by this Institute, because I was brought here to sort of
tell you the straight goods on deals and VCs and what really goes on in the
trenches.., but I find out I am sitting next to a reverend, and my every word
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is being recorded by every media imaginable. So under advice of my
counsel, I would like to conclude my remarks for today...
So the first section really discusses what each side doesn't like about the
other. And to start with the VC as the first target, what are the beefs on
venture capitalists? The first one, increasingly so, is "why are their term
sheets so aggressive? 20 Why are deals getting scarier and scarier, getting
more complex?"
Frankly, it is the nature of the beast. It is a negotiation, with a lot at stake
economically and otherwise.2' So you are always looking for the upper hand,
Brad Cherniak is Co-Founder and Partner of Sapient Capital Partners,
a Toronto-based
firm which advises mid-market and early stage companies in the areas of growth and corporate
strategy, acquisitions and divestitures, and the sourcing of capital. Mr. Cherniak has close to
20 years of experience in investment research, corporate and investment banking, and
merchant banking and private equity venture capital with such firms as CIBC Wood Gundy,
Gordon Capital, Bank of America and Chemical Bank. Mr. Cherniak graduated Summa Cum
Laude from the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business.
. After being educated in High School by the Quakers at George School
in Philadelphia,
Cathy went on to graduate from the University of Michigan in 1983, The Ohio State College
of Law in 1986 and The University of Kent Canterbury Theological College in England in
1999. In 2000, she was ordained as an Episcopal priest. Cathy has spent over 20 years
cultivating a global mergers & acquisitions and venture finance legal practice, serving a
myriad of clients that range from the Fortune 100 companies to emerging and mid-market
enterprises. She spent 15 years in London, where she developed a passion for technology in
the emerging companies' market place. In Europe, she formed her own consulting practice and
worked with global enterprises and start-ups to foster and capture the value of strategic
technology innovation. Cathy has dedicated herself to transforming economies through the
creation of truly innovative business strategies using technology. While in London, Cathy
served as a trusted advisor to the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to help
generate ways in which technology development could drive economic outcomes for Britain.
After her years in London, Cathy recently returned to her native United States to continue her
practice of law and consult with technology driven enterprises. Cathy is the founder and leader
of the Red Room Revolution, a set of 20 economic development initiatives structured to
transform the Northeast Ohio Region using a technology platform. She also is a founder of the
Beta Strategy Group and Beta Opportunity Partners Fund which has made a commitment to
fund 24 technology companies in 18-36 months. To date, Cathy has funded 6 companies and
founded 3 of her own. She also envisioned and started the Beta Technology Park in Mayfield
Village, Ohio which transformed a decaying industrial park into a tech home for early stage
companies to grow using a shared services platform to lower overheads. She has recently
renovated an old barn to headquarter her new business, Children's Technology Workshop,
which educates second to eighth graders in creative play using technology. Finally, Cathy is an
Associate Priest at Trinity Cathedral in Cleveland, Ohio.
20 See, e.g., Joseph L. Lemon, Venture CapitalismAfter the Burst of the Internet Bubble:
Selecting FinancingTerms with Care, 2 MINN. J. Bus. L. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 5-6 (2003),
available at http://www.centerforbusinesslaw.org/joumal/v2nl/lemon.pdf
(discussing
aggressive term sheets).
21 See generally Vivek Wadhwa, Before You Accept VC Funding...A Veteran Entrepreneur
Tells You What You Need to Look For in a Venture-Capital Firm Before You Agree to a Deal,
Bus. WK. (August 3, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/aug2006/
*
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and you22are trying to get the best valuation possible, the best terms
possible.
It is also a natural, broad trend in business - as companies become more
efficient, shareholders increase their expectations, all given a turbo boost by
hedge funds and other activist shareholders, every side of every corporate
relationship attempts to squeeze every last dime of value from their
counterparties. You are forced in a sense to get more creative over time, to
get more and more aggressive and scary going in.
I also think the lawyers should take their share of the blame! I have had
some very creative counsels that thrilled me over the years as a venture
capital fund manager, in giving me scary new implements with which to beat
the entrepreneur over the head if necessary! So lawyers have to take their
share of the blame!
All this being said, I think there is an interesting and even counterintuitive sea change happening in the market. There is an interesting new
trend towards simplicity and trust, and it is kind of driven by the
developments I just described above. I can speak to that very well from my
own experience - it is also driven by simple practical reality in such cases
where you have companies where the venture capital funds are putting in
multiple rounds of capital, possibly with new investors coming in on some of
these different rounds. I have had these types of situations where the paper
trail of documents and terms and rights and obligations becomes so
complicated and convoluted and overlapping and conflicting that, despite
having all these nuclear weapons, there is essentially no way to detonate
them before you can get your own butt out of the room!
So what you have to do in this instance is frankly start with a blank sheet
of paper and say, okay, all of us clever professionals have kind of painted
ourselves into a strategic and intellectual comer here. We can't make
decisions because we've got five different shareholders agreements - each
more complex than the last - it becomes hard to say who trumps whom. So
let's call it a draw and re-cut the pie. One can look at this situation and
wonder what all the legal expense and effort was for. Simplicity is becoming
more practical. It is becoming a practical thing as well as a trust-driven thing.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I find it interesting to blame the lawyers
because during yesterday, making a list of the terms that pervade our space,
and they come from lawyers: preference, drag, tag, ratchet, hatchet,
laddering, pump and dump, underpricing, crowdouts, control, forced exit,
rushed exit, later-stage blinders, piggyback, grand standing, flips.
MR. CHERNIAK: I have done every one of those... some twice!

sb20060802_804397.htm.
22 See generally id.
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MS. HORTON-PANZICA: If anybody doesn't know what any of that
means, it is the dirty language that pervades what we are doing. And when
we started talking about this session, I said, you know, why don't we talk
about what we need to do as responsible professionals to change this?
I like to say that the trend that I have been trying to work with the
investments that my group is doing, and in partnership with other people, is
to simplify due diligence, so you don't have entrepreneurs who should be
running their businesses and inventing and being creative fund people. They
are spending nine months in due diligence for a million dollars that is not
even spent, and having them review 15 drafts of 45 term sheets for the 45
people who are investing, and completely send them down side roads when
they need to be straight ahead.
The investments that we have been doing - we don't even present the
term sheet until all of the investors in the consortium agree. There is one term
sheet that the entrepreneur is reviewing for everyone.
We also have a fixed due diligence program where we only do due
diligence upfront on the things we really, really care about. So we are
changing - actually, there are a few things we really, really care about - the
intellectual property and how quickly are we going to cash flow based on the
numbers we think are there.
Once we know when we are going to cash flow and whether the IP is
commerciable outside of the opportunity, then we have done a lot of the derisking already. We will not have to spend nine months in due diligence. We
don't have to get into 45 term sheets, and we don't have to get into ratchets
and hatchets and preference. None of that stuff is really what's on the table;
we have taken all that off.
So I sort of wanted to say, in this trend about where we are going in the
common beefs, is why don't we as professionals try to get rid of some of this
mystification of deals and the way that we treat one another and start
simplifying things for the entrepreneur.
MR. CHERNIAK: Just on the second point, this is a question I get asked
a lot by entrepreneurs, and part of it is just the nature of the business. You
know, the entrepreneurs, they know they need capital, but frankly, they are
not happy about needing it. 23 And some of them actually don't know they
need it; they just know that they need something. 24
Again it is the nature of the business. You are coming in, and you are
taking a chunk of an entrepreneur's baby, their dream. So it is kind of a
negative starting point almost in nature. I think, as well as the nature of the
23 See, e.g., Giacinta Cestone, Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or
Formal

Control?

3

(2001),

http://www.recercat.net/bitstreanf2072/1967/l/48001.pdf.
4Cf Id.

available

at
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business in venture capital, that the women and men in the venture
capital
25
business living with this are spread very thin, partly by design.
One has to wonder why the venture capital funds couldn't add more VCs
per dollar invested, just so they could spend a little more time, be a little less
abrupt in their dealings with people - but at the end of the day, as a VC you
really are forced to run from deal to deal, crisis to crisis, opportunity to
opportunity, which kind of creates the incentive to be somewhat abrupt and
very efficient with your time, so to speak.
I think success also does breed overconfidence in the industry. There
certainly is an arrogance wafting through the industry. It is a dog-eat-dog
industry, with little love lost between venture capitalists, each seeking to win
their way through, compete against other venture capitalists, and get their
money into the marquee companies.
You have got to be a sharp-elbowed tough man or woman to do it. The
more and more successes you have as a fund, the more the VC becomes a
caricature of what they were in the business to begin with--personality quirks
get more and more pronounced, since there is no one to set them straight.
You, as the VC, end up failing to recognize your own limitations, and you
get into an operational groove in terms of the way your fund does business.
You will slam a square peg into a round hole because you are a very
successful square peg!
Funds tend to try to replicate their successes by doing what they did well
in the past, like a pitcher with a good slider and not much else they are very
confident in. Your fund may be particularly adept at some particular function
like finding new sales channels for software companies or merging
investments together or adding aggressive, operationally focused executives
in their Rolodex to accelerate the pace of companies getting to the next level.
You tend to go sort of back to the things that you are good at, and sometimes
again it turns you again into pounding square pegs into round holes, whether
your action is optimal or even needed at that moment, or whether the CEO
recognizes the need or agrees, that's what you do anyway - turn your
companies into the same sort of animal.
And then I think the last point is fairly commonly felt by entrepreneurs - I
certainly have seen it. VCs can certainly lack a bit of respect for the effort
and skill it has taken to create what has been built to date. This is a difficult
and complex issue, and not easily summed up or solved.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Among the most frequent complaints that I
have heard from entrepreneurs who are accepting venture money is that they
end up feeling completely devalued in the process. 26 They are in a situation
25 See generally Lorin Cohen, Writing your Business Plan, BIOENTREPRENEUR 1 (2002),

http://www.nature.com/bioent/building/planning/012003/pf/nbtO6O2supp-BE33-pf.html.
6 See, e.g., Ralf Becker & Thomas F. Hellman, The Genesis of Venture Capital:Lessons
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in which
they created a seed of wealth for everybody, and investors lose sight
27
of that.
They created the seed of wealth from which the venture capitalists are
going to make these astounding returns, we hope. And somehow in the
process of the arrogance of having the money, we forget about the value of
the person's creations. And so we set up an aggressive and some sense of
animosity between the venture players and the person that has created them.28
And I like to think that what we certainly are trying to build into our
environment is a different sense of conscience about how we treat
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are creative.29 They are out of the box and they
have this sense of creativity, and when you try and stamp it down and press it
in and put it in a box and limit it, you have killed it. Until you get the venture
capitalist with the right appreciation for that mind set - again back towards
that mind set - and appreciating it and valuing it, I think we are trying to
inject the wrong kind of personality next to the relationship of the
entrepreneur.
DR. KING: Have you had any bad experiences with your new approach,
which I think is a good one?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I haven't yet. The one situation, which I got
back into a good resolution, was that I met a young chap from New York. He
was talking about his company in a session that I was in, and I went up to
him, and I said, "I am going to invest in you, and I like you. I like who you
are, and I am going to let you run with what I see." And I did that, and he
was bought six months later by a public company. And that was a good
thing.
But as he was exiting, I had a right to take some additional warrants, and I
gave that up because the investment was so short because I didn't feel good
about taking them. I know that sounds really strange, but I actually didn't
feel good about it. I made a huge return.
I gave up warrants, and he had to transfer money to my group, but he
didn't pay it for about 90 days. I told him, "You know, I trusted you. I dealt
with you with a certain ethic, and you are violating it." Once I sent that email to this chap, we had the money wired within 24 hours.

from the German Experience, CESifo Conference Centre 12-16 (Nov. 22-23, 2002)
http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/porta/ifoContent/N/neucesifo/CONFERENCES/
SCCONF_1999-2006NCE02/PAPERSNCE02-HELLMANN.PDF (unpublished research
paper used in CESifo Conference in Munich).
Id. at 14.
28 Id. at 12-13.
29 Debora Markley & Don Mackey, Community Environment for Entrepreneurship,
CENTER

FOR

RURAL

ENTREPRENEURSHIP,

http://www.ruraleship.org/content/content/pdf/Community.pdf.

June

2003,

at

2,
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If you are going to work that way, you have to demand it in return, right,
because it is not the environment. But it worked, but you have to keep it real.
I am much happier operating that way. I don't want to be in this drag tag
ratchet and hatchet. I am not interested.
MR. CHERNIAK: That's actually a good segue to this point, which is, do
30
deal terms actually limit relationships between investors and entrepreneurs?
And I think the answer is actually yes. Although I hate to admit, I have done
the same thing in terms of not exercising the rights that I legally have in my
agreements. At the end of the day, you want to make sure you don't poison
the relationship with your entrepreneur, to be penny-wise and pound-foolish.
Although you may be entitled to it under your agreements, if you strip the
entrepreneur of too much of their equity and upside, either for
underperformance or additional unforeseen capital requirements, the
relationship and possibly the investment is eventually going to break down.
The entrepreneur is going to lose interest and motivation. They are going to
either break down or leave! By the end of the day, you start to wonder
whether having all those rights are actually necessary.
Again, although I have to admit that looking forward in negotiating future
deals I would probably still try to get these weapons. It would be hard to give
them up, but I am not sure I would use them. And I think one of the key
points in this discussion is that the personal relationship between the VC and
the entrepreneur, the chemistry is absolutely paramount in successful
investing.
You may have a big institutional fund name; you may have a high-profile,
sexy company name with big dollars involved. However, at the end of the
day, it is two people, and if it doesn't work, if they don't trust each other or
they don't take each other's advice, if they don't listen, the relationship is
screwed.
You are not going to be successful, no matter how good your technology
is, how good or smart the entrepreneur is, or how smart the VC is. In my
mind, it is the most critical aspect of venture capital and the linchpin of
success, but it is also the least scientific and the toughest thing to nail. That is
why, as I moved over to the advisory side of the relationship between these
two animals, it was really to figure out the best way to make sure that match
is there, and you are not just taking the best money at the best terms. You are
putting together the women and men who fit best with that entrepreneur.
30

Cf. TONY BERRY, DAVID LEE, JIA MIAO & ROBERT SWEETING, AccOUNTING AND

IN A VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING
PROCESS 2,
available at
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:hvsPNciyO8YJ:www.licom.pt/eaa2007/papers/EAA2007
_0325_final.pdf+ACCOUNTING+AND+ACCOUNTABILITY+IN+A+VENTURE+CAPIT
AL+FUNDING+PROCESS+%22tony+berry%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1
(Investeeentrepreneur relationships are similar to that of principal-agent relationships, where
information asymmetry leads to agents limiting effort).
ACCOUNTABILITY
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You know, with most of my clients I spent more time than I almost cared
to in the trenches, really seeing how they function, how they think, what
drives them, what scares the hell out of them, and what changes their
behavior. And similarly dealing with a bunch of VCs, as either colleagues or
competitors or friends, you see what their hot buttons are; the match is the
critical thing.
I think "overly-nasty" agreements tend to keep the two at arms length.
The CEO tends to go into a shell, probably for good reason! You know, they
are scared to death of losing their company. So maintaining that chemistry is
key to a good relationship, in my mind.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I think a lot of the relationships get off on the
wrong foot because we don't have the money right. So many times I have
young entrepreneurs come into our group, and they are either asking for too
much money, too little money, or they don't need money when they are
asking for it. So they are asking for an engagement with the venture world,
when they
don't have the quality and quantity of what they actually need to
31
finance.
You automatically set up a situation where a venture capitalist is going to
give too much money to an entity and want a deeper return, not enough
money and risk wanting a deeper return, or putting money in when they don't
really need it and getting a better return, right? 32 So we are setting up the
wrong chemistry.
So I think part of a professional's job and part of the venture capitalist's
job is to stop that process and sit down with the entrepreneur and say,
actually, do you have this quite right? I had a wonderful client from San
Francisco, and she had great technology. I would invest tomorrow, but she
doesn't need me now. I sent her home and said you don't want my money
right now. Keep pressing with friends and family right now.
You are all right like this, and you are going to make it. Come back, and
we will raise you around, but you don't need it right now. That was the right
thing to say. I think that if you create that sense of trust by taking a look at
the mechanics of the money and when it is needed, that's a much better
relationship.
The other comment I had here is that rather than looking at the terms that
I just read off to you in a basket of rights for the venture money, I like to say
to the entrepreneur, this is our environment. I invite you to play in it with us,
and if you achieve these three or four or five milestones, if you do this and
you are exceptional, you will have rights and money and extra value coming
back to you.
31

See, e.g., Rob Holland, Planning Against a Business Failure, AGRIc. DEV. CTR

TnNN., ADC INFo #24, at 3 (1998) availableat http://cpa.utk.edu/pdffiles/adc24.pdf.
32

Id.

-

U.
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It is called in our business a clawback.33 Do I give you a clawback of
some of what you have given to me because you truly are exceptional and
you can prove it? Then you have given a modicum of respect to this
entrepreneur.
It is a different field than all these rights on their own in favor of the
venture capitalist.
MR. McCREARY: Cathy, why do you call it a clawback and not an
incentive?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: That's a good point. You are saying you have
a right to actually bring it back. The language should change. It is not really
an incentive;
it is a right to earn back what they had to give up in order to get
34
the equity.
MR. McCREARY: My follow-up question is whether most of the terms
can be turned into positives rather than subtractions and negatives?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Absolutely.
MR. McCREARY: And if you get that environment, isn't that what
happens in the ones that have been winners for you? Have you ever seen it
not be the case where the relationship was very positive?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Absolutely.
MR. McCREARY: And once there are failures, you are always a failure.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: There are negatives, and the industry calls it a
clawback. I mean, we use these terms. We throw them out; it is aggressive.
The ones that stay when the chemical reaction is right, it is just on fire. It
really creates an exciting, positive relationship.
I am going to Toronto next Sunday to go see these entrepreneurs in
Toronto. I am counting the days since I am so excited.
So that's the kind of chemistry you want from the person putting money
behind you, and I think when that changes, it is like any relationship, right?
Once you interject negative comment or aggression into any relationship in
your life, it is the same way, right? 35 So what's your conscience - why is
your conscience any different when you invest in money? Is it money that
makes us gorillas and ugly? I guess.

33 DAVID L. ScoTr, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS FOR
INVESTOR
(Houghton
Mifflin
Company
2003)
available
at

TODAY'S

http://dictionary.reference.combrowse/clawback (clawback is defined as "[e]xcessive
management share of profits that must be refunded to investors of a venture capital fund. A
clawback is required when managers of a venture capital fund take a contractual share of early
investment gains that are subsequently reduced by losses").
34 Id.
35 See e.g., Geraldine Downey & Scott I. Feldman, Implications of Rejection Sensitivityfor
Intimate Relationships, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1327, 1329 (1996), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/socialrelations/downloads/rspersonal.pdf.
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MR. McCREARY: No. I think it is a question of people not meshing well,
and the chemical relationship between the venture capital and the
entrepreneur is as important as the money relationship.36
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Well, in our relationships with the people in
our lives, we don't have all these ratchets and hatchets and claws and all that
stuff going on, do we? We don't talk about it.
I guess what I am saying, why don't we create an environment where we
don't have that language exist, and you change it, which is the point you are
also making, so that those relationships are supportive and ones that induce
success rather than failure.
MR. CHERNIAK: There are different nomenclatures for clawbacks. In
my last deal, it was called an "earnback." I have also seen it referred to as a
"reverse option," among other things. I have seen a whole bunch of different
names, but for me, actually, I find as long as you are negotiating "straight
up" with the entrepreneur, it doesn't matter. For example, one term that is in
a lot of term sheets that I never accepted and never will is "investment
multiplier," which kicks in when you sell a company.37
As an example, the venture capital fund puts $5 million into a company.
Under this term, the fund must receive or "earnback" $15 million before the
entrepreneur and other existing stakeholders get anything. I have always
found that to be a backdoor way of negotiating more equity, sometimes
without the entrepreneur even understanding the real economic meaning of
the term. It is becoming less common these days, although it was very
common in the venture capital boom times around 1999 and 2000. 3
I find when you take out terms like that, that scare the entrepreneur into
thinking, "I really need to understand how this REALLY works," if the
agreement is more straightforward, you can still keep some aggressive terms
in there. 39
36 See, e.g., Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Syndication Networks and the Spatial
Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, 106 AM. J. OF SOC. 1546, 1549-1551 (2001),
available at http:/leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/bhagatlsyndicationnetworksvc-investments.pdf
("Professional relationships provide one of the primary vehicles for accessing timely and

reliable information about promising new ventures")
37 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY
MONEY

82

(Elizabeth

Johnson

ed.,

Harcourt,

OF EMPLOYMENT,

Inc.

1964)

(1953)

INTEREST AND

available at

http://www.unilibrary.com/books/Keynes,%20John%2OMaynard%20%20The%20General%20Theory%20of%20Employment,%201nterest%20and%2OMoney.pdf.
38 Cf Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, The Interaction Between Product
Market and
Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital, 13 (4) THE REv. OF FIN. STUD. 959, 980-981
(2000) available at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/hellmann/pdfs/RFSofficial.pdf (stating that
the number of firms looking to use venture capital is increasing, thus type and terms of
investment are more likely to favor entrepreneurs, which controls development path of
companies).
39 See, e.g., Lemon, supra note 20, at 6, 7.
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If it is a clawback, it is a clawback. As long as it is straightforward, you
hope the chemistry of that relationship is solid. It is the kind of stuff that
really springs on you later, which the entrepreneur doesn't really understand
the effects of it until it hits them in the head or their lawyer informs the what
this thing really going to do to them that kills the chemistry and possibly the
investment ultimately!
MR. McCREARY: Of course, no guarantee.
MR. CHERNIAK: Oh, you have those, too. But it is when you, as the
entrepreneur, are surprised by terms that that were not really highlighted or
fully explained in the negotiation, I find that poisons the relationship.
MR. SANDLER: Let's turn to the good, Brad.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: That's actually a very worthwhile point, part
of what poisons the relationship with the venture capitalist. One of my very
dear friends who started a business - very successful, invested in by large
houses in New York - he is going to leave in the next two or three months
with five percent of this company, and he is so bitter.4 °
And the reason why he is going to do that is because he took on equity too
soon, and he took on too much, and he didn't need it all, and he gave away
the bank, literally. And so, you know, being penny-wise and kind of poundfoolish, giving up equity, he came to me, and he wants to do another
company.4 '
He said, "I don't want any venture money at all. I don't want to see it
again." This is a guy that is going to start three or four or five companies
before he is finished with his career. Probably until he is gone he will be
starting new companies, and this is his attitude now. That's sad.
That's why I think the negotiation of the amount of money we actually
advise entrepreneurs to pay - and they even have a drawdown. I have done
that. I had one deal where I had given him a drawdown and to take what they
need, and I get a little richer because the money is drawn, because then they
need more from me.
And I have more money at risk, but giving them a drawdown to take what
they need as they need it in case things go wrong, that's a very civilized way
of financing something.
MR. CHERNIAK: The flipside to that, both of these, to me, are such
critical points in terms of how deals get done and whether deals end up being
good or bad. To play the devil's advocate for a second - I like doing that.
40
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MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Where is your fork?
MR. CHERNIAK: I think it was in the soup last night!
I recently put a deal on ice for an entrepreneur who was too much the
other way, too equity-stingy - he could not accept the idea of taking any
dilution at all, and, in fact, turned down money that was critically needed for
his company. He is at the point where he is growing, but doesn't have a full
appreciation of the effect of growth on cash flow. This is actually where most
entrepreneurs kind of run off the rails, is not understanding that your business
is booming, but it is not going to generate cash flow as quickly as it generates
profit. Indeed, it will continue to consume cash in the form of working
capital to sustain the growth.
So you need a balance sheet to grow your company. I have spent a lot of
time on that topic with entrepreneurs, and with this one in particular, I just
could not get the point across.4 2 And frankly, he could lose his business
because of it, for sort of the opposite reason, and that again is being too
stingy on giving up equity.43
There is a balance between the two, not taking too much, not taking too
little and the problem extends in both directions."a
But let's get to the good stuff! Bottom line, the situation is not so bad.
Actually, overall, the relationship is working, and we will talk a little bit
about the macro numbers.
But when it does work, I think you will agree it can be a fantastic
relationship. VCs can and do fill in the gaps (or weaknesses or blind spots)
that all entrepreneurs have to some extent. When they recognize they have
these gaps, the relationship can work very well. As an example, a gap could
be, you know, being a great operator but not being very good at managing
people; or being visionaries in their businesses but not understanding really
how to put a business together and make it work and earn sort of the money
they need to make their investors happy. So the VCs can be perfect to just to
fill in those gaps or blind spots.
Another critical aspect of the VC/entrepreneur relationship is in guiding
the entrepreneur to pick the low hanging fruit - the basic elements of what
makes a business successful, and sustainable. This blocking and tackling is
something every company has to do. If you have been in the corporate
finance/venture capital industry for as long as I have been, these points
become second nature, but you realize they aren't necessarily as clear to an
entrepreneur. You must keep them focused, hew to a flexible, proactive, and
reactive strategic plan and use all the resources in the company to their
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maximum. This can be, conceptually, fairly simple, but actually much harder
said than done.
I think if entrepreneurs have a weakness: sometimes they don't know
when to stop. 45 I had one, with a very successful, growing early stage
enterprise, a software company for which we executed a financing for very
recently. He is just at the cusp of breaking into the U.S. market - big
enterprise customers.
His average unit sale going forward will likely be in excess of his total
cumulative historical sales, and he will now be dealing with giants such as
Boeing and Microsoft and Wal-Mart and those types. That's all fine and nice.
You stretch to the max to meet their high expectations and short tempers. He
is just barely keeping it together, and he gets a visit from a group of
entrepreneurs from Dubai who are setting up sort of a venture capital
incubator in the Middle East. Intriguing, but probably ten years away from
fruition, and it is going to take a lot of work and a lot of pain, attention and
travel - and money. They come to him saying, you know, we would like to
incorporate your technology into our concept. All you need to do is provide
us with technical and managerial and some executive expertise and some
money.
So he brings me in and says, "This looks interesting." My reaction, if you
edit out the expletives, was to say nothing! Again, the entrepreneur's creative
engine just doesn't have brakes or, perhaps, a steering wheel. The insights of
a VC were critical here to avoid a costly and potentially fatal dalliance
caused by well-intentioned naivety coupled with endless energy and
enthusiasm! The system worked here.
The Company ended up walking away from that opportunity because it
was the prudent thing to do, and I think that's what a VC has to do, or an
advisor in this case - to focus his efforts and make sure he is focused on his
core business, which in this case is enterprise software business - moving
from Canada to the U.S. I just don't know why he thought he had all this free
time and bandwidth to spend in Dubai, but what are you going to do?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Before you go on to the governance piece, it
would be interesting - I don't know how many companies you invested in
your group - which you would say the entrepreneurs are? Good CEOs? And
one of these CEOs, and I was sitting in the back trying to think about that
before I spoke, and I am under 50 percent, and therefore, you got a massive
blind spot because the point is the entrepreneur wants to be the CEO.
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MR. COHEN: I have a question in regards to your initial comment and a
things you
most recent comment. That pertains to one of the most important
46
look at, and you stated you look at the IP and the cash flow.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: And the people.
MR. COHEN: That's the key.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: And the people. I don't even get there until I
like the people.
MR. COHEN: Many instances you recognize immediately that the
entrepreneur doesn't have the management skill to take it further. And how
often do you tell them that before you fund it, that you are going to have to
bring in outside management? Do you tell them that initially? Do you wait?
What's your process?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I don't even get to the IP and cash flow until I
see the person is somebody that just excites me with the spark that they have
and the drive and the ambition and the foresight for whatever market they are
in to be able to drive and drive hard. Otherwise, I am not interested if I don't
have that upfront.
I would say I am very honest. I say, "this is what you are good at, and
what we need to do is get you this set of management skills. That's
something we will do; we will even do it for you until we find the right
person." I have done that.
I am doing that right now in a company that I invested in. I love their
technology, and they now have been taken in by a large vendor as a software
tool. It has been a great investment. The guys that developed the software, I
told upfront, that they were going to need help. I put someone on the board,
and I have the head of my investment fund actually working alongside these
guys constantly on management issues and getting the right management
team around them. So I say it upfront because if I am putting money in as a
passive investor and see problems, I am actually not interested in that model
because I know it is going to fail.
One time I did that recently where I went alongside other investors and
stood back. Even though I loved the technology, but I had real doubts
whether he could lead and didn't go with my instincts. It has been, at best,
challenging.
I think you have to instinctively be very upfront and fill that gap if you
are capable. If you managed the P & L and are worried about whether the
employees can pay their mortgages, which I have, then, if you cut your teeth
on that worry, you can drive management help into the VC environment,
where the entrepreneurs never had to worry about that.
46 See generally Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, How Do Venture Capitalists Choose
Investments? (August 2000) (unpublished thesis, on file with the Graduate School of Business,
University of Chicago), availableat http://isc-capital.com/downloads/aic82k.pdf.
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They had just been inventing, right? And now they are taking on
employees; they are taking on space; they are taking on cost; and where is
the conscience about whether I can pay the bills? Where is my cash flow?
Where is my customer base? How am I going to pay my people?
So if that's the mindset you have, you have to put the skills out there, and
you have to be the one that sees the blind spot and say, "Here, if you want
my money, then you also want this expertise because if you don't want this
expertise and us to help you with the management side of this, then don't
have my money."
MR. CHERNIAK: We spend a lot of time on transactions of earlier stage
companies and the notion of being very upfront with, usually, a CEO or
founder about what's likely going to happen after the institutional capital is
in, and whether this scenario will be acceptable to them. What's the range of
outcomes they are willing to accept in order for the company to be successful
- which could be bringing someone in just under them, such as an
experienced COO, or in some cases it could be bringing in a new CEO above
the founder and putting them into a technology executive role or sales,
second-in-command.
We spend a lot of time with the dynamics of what the team is going to
look like before and after the money comes in.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: What's your - you asked a question, what's
your - do you agree with what I am saying, or do you have a different
approach?
MR. COHEN: No. I agree with what you are saying. I just wonder how
much you do with due diligence, use some tools like physiological testing?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Yeah.
MR. COHEN: Have you spent time interviewing the spouse?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I have not done that.
MR. COHEN: Because you are right, entrepreneurs are a special breed.
The conflict you get between the institutional venture capitalist and the
entrepreneur very often comes when you intrude on their management, when
you try and put that skill set in. 47
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Yeah, I agree. It is interesting on the spouse
side because I have an investor that is in trouble because the spouse is not
supporting the entrepreneur. And it is very, very disappointing. The
entrepreneur is a 24-7 pizza-under-the-door kind of guy and the spouse isn't
willing to support such a lifestyle when the business requires it.
MR. COHEN: I will close it out. You don't want to hear my war story.
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MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I love your war story, but that's very
interesting. I wonder how violated one might feel saying I want to interview
your spouse, but I would like to talk about that a bit more.
MR. CHERNIAK: It goes the other way as well in terms of delving into
what the VCs are really like, talking to their investees, talking to their
partners. That's a process that we spend a lot of time advising our clients to
insist on - that they spend a lot of time with the individual VC that is going
to be there going forward, as their director, their guide, and their institutional
investor. Entrepreneurs should also meet the VC's partners in social settings,
as well as some of their investees. The good funds are only too happy to
facilitate this. If they are wary, you have something to worry about.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: You know, when you are advising an
entrepreneur about what type of venture capitalist you want to go to or
should go to, it is very important to look at the track record of the money. 48
Those VCs that have great track records of staying in deals, the entrepreneur
ought to be interviewing hugely the venture capitalist.
This should be a beauty contest both ways. How have you succeeded?
What have you done? Let me interview your investments. Let me talk to the
people you dealt with. Let me talk to management of companies because this
is a marriage. It is a broker's marriage, and if you get the wrong chemistry,
you know the marriage certificate, right?
So, you know, how are we setting up anything that is any different if we
don't get the chemistry right between the entrepreneur and the VC? You
know, if you have got a young venture firm that has a proven track record,
they are going to grandstand investments. They are going to grandstand
them. They are going to dump them early. They are going to do early exits to
build their portfolios. Do you want to be with a grandstander or do you want
to be with somebody that has got a little bit of experience and stayed in
investments?
And they put money at risk, and they have been a long-term venture
capitalist. They put their money where their mouth is, so it is very important
that when you pair the entrepreneurs with the venture capitalists, it is the
right kind of venture capitalists.4 9
MR. CHERNIAK: I think we have talked about a lot of these points, but I
think one critical one - and again I think we kind of touched on this - but it
is a horse sense of how to help the entrepreneur build his team. I think, when
I was in the business, in my own mind, I spent half my time on what I call
48 See, e.g., Rafael Amit, James Brander, & Christoph Zott, Why do Venture CapitalFirms
Exist? Theory and CanadianEvidence, 12 J. OF Bus. VENTURING 441,444 (1998), availableat

http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/brander/papers/Why%2Do%2OVenture%20Capital%2OFirms%
20Exist%201998.pdf.
49 See, e.g., Sorenson & Stuart, supra note 36, at 9.
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human resource issues, because one of the biggest areas where a VC can add
value is in helping the entrepreneur avoid making big mistakes in hires. 50
Speed them up the learning curve using your own experiences up the same
learning curve.
You may have your team of three people, and you are bringing a sales
executive or some other critical role, at this point the stakes are so high, an
error in judgment could start the chain of events that could be fatal to your
business. 5 1 Early stage companies are all about chemistry and positive
momentum, and are not well positioned to recover from disruptions in these
areas.
So I think one of the most critical things that a VC brings is not only
qualified people to fill that key new role, but the horse sense to figure out
whether the fit is mutually right, whether52 it is the right company for them,
and whether they are going to stick it out.
We had one client, a software company based in Montr6al, which raided a
high-ranking executive from a big public U.S. company, but without
realizing how much they were going to have to pay to keep this guy happy in
the medium term, in both cash and in common equity of the company - this
person was very excited about the company's concept and potential, but at
the end of the day, the economics didn't work - neither side really did their
homework. This is a very costly mistake for companies.
But I guess I need to pick up the pace here. I would like to talk about the
next point for a long time, but why don't we just go on?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I think one thing that I would like to say is, as
professionals, if you find that the entrepreneur or the venture capitalist has
made a bad employment decision, the worst mistake is to try and fix it. 53 Get
rid of it. I mean, I think what I have learned, if you try and fix a bad hire or a
bad situation, it only gets worse. 54
It is far better for all professionals involved to say we made a bad
decision. Let's go find the right person as soon as possible. You just fix it.
Trying to nurse something along is detrimental to the younger business that

50 See, e.g., Robin Broadway & Motohiro Sato, Entrepreneurship and Symmetric
Information in Input Markers (Sept. 2005) (unpublished paper, collaboration between
Broadway of Queens University and Sato of Hitotsubashi University), available at
http:llwww.unicatt.itlDottoratilDefap/AllegatilBoadway-Sen-inar.pdf.
Cf.id.
Cf id.
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54 Cf. Carolyn L. Rumfelt, You're Fired,Twice!, 11 KAN. EMP. L. LETTER, Nov. 2004.
52
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is using its capital on someone that is not who they should be in the
business.5 5
And that's not an unkind way of dealing with the world. It is just that your
gifts didn't match what we wanted, so there is a very human way of dealing
with it. You weren't what we expected, and we need to part ways.
MR. CHERNIAK: Briefly, I think one way to reduce the risk of having
that bad one-on-one chemistry is to try to introduce small syndicates to earlystage deals, having two or three VCs rather than one.
Most VCs are not terribly open to a small investment. What can also
happen is to sort of force capital down the entrepreneur's throat just to make
the deal work. The entrepreneur can be forced to increase the size of the deal,
take more capital than he or she perhaps needs, in order to allow each of the
funds in the group to deploy enough capital to make the deal worth their
while.
So, you know, you now have two or three VCs, with a nice relationship
with the entrepreneur. The funds sort of keep each other honest, and they
diffuse the power that a VC has going into a relationship with an
entrepreneur. Usually one or more of the funds in the group ends up being
the "good cop" in the relationship, giving the entrepreneur some needed
psychological support.
And in this structure, the funds sort of keep each other in line - even
though it might appear that the relationship would be two or three against one
now, instead of one-on-one - but the structure again sort of balances things
out, frankly, balances the relationship a bit. Really, it kind of diffuses the
power, I guess. I encourage this for deals.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I love it, and it works beautifully when it is
just a little more risk than I want to tolerate. If you think of the number of
business plans that we look at, there are hundreds, and the few deals we
actually do, it is not that some of the others didn't really take me away, I
loved them, but they were just too much risk.56
And so the question is whether we can fund some of those opportunities
by locking arms in our environment, and you know, we are talking about: do
we need venture capital? Absolutely. And we need venture capitalists that are
willing to lock on and say, "You know what? We want to share this risk and
do it."
And that would enable more deals to be done if we can promote that
collaboration amongst people and investors that have the same ethic. 57 You
55 See generally LUECKE, supra note 53.
56 See generally Brett Nelson, How to Increase Your Venture Odds, VENTURE CAPITAL J.,

May 1, 2005, 2005 WLNR 6846743 (discussing how venture capitalists engage in
probabilistic investing by balancing both risk and return).
57 See generally Michael J. Robinson & Thomas J. Cottrell, Investment Patterns of
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know, that would make a lot of sense to me. If there were ways to promote
that, I would encourage us all as professionals to think about it because it
would be a huge help to the entrepreneurial world.
MR. CHERNIAK: To address the Canada versus U.S. aspect, which is a
key component for this conference, I have found that Canadian transactions
are becoming much more like American transactions. There has been a
definite convergence of the two, and I think it is both good and bad.
Canadian deals and U.S. deals now are really hard to tell apart.58
Ten years ago it was vastly different. I could tell in two seconds looking
at a term sheet, a letter of intent, or nondisclosure, or any other deal
document, whether it was American or Canadian. Now the border is frankly
irrelevant in my business. Our deals, we tend to look into geographic "pods,"
which criss-cross the borders sort of blindly. Most of our analysis is done
east-west. The north-south doesn't really matter. The East Coast has its own
sort of desires in terms of looking for investments and their own sort of
operating styles. Central has one, and the West has one, but they all crisscross the border.59
And the issue for Canada is that it is a small country, with a pretty small
pool of capital overall, and that it is never
going to have the critical mass that
60
the U.S. market has on several levels.
You know, there is around $22 - 24 billion of venture capital in Canada in
total, and last year in the U.S. they raised about $27 billion just last year in
the tech field.6' In the 2000 "bubble" era, it was $105 billion, and Canada
raised about $6 billion. 62 So the markets differ by orders of magnitude. I
Informal Investors in the Alberta Private Equity Market. 45 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT 47 (2007),

2007 WLNR 4360035 (discussing that investors choosing to invest based on relationships
provide a major source of capital for entrepreneurs).
58 See e.g., Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. Maclntosh, Venture CapitalExits in Canada
and the United States, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 101, 101-200 (2002) available at
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/papers/Cummings-Maclntosh.pdf.
9 Cf. Symposium, Global Insight, Venture Impact 2004 Venture Capital Benefits to the
U.S. Economy, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N 45
(2004) available at
http://www.globalinsight.com/publicDownload/genericContent/07-20-04-fullstudy.pdf
(explaining that Canada and the U.S. have similar investment styles, operating mostly in earlystae investment, and Canada is largely financed by U.S. based venture funding).

See generally SME
FINANCING

FINANCING DATA INITIATIVE, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISE
IN CANADA - PART IV: PROFILE OF RISK CAPITAL FINANCING (2003),

http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/sme-fdi-prf.pme.nsf/en/01063e.html
("[T]he
regional
concentration of venture capital activity in Canada is endemic to the industry.").
61 See JEAN-PHILIPPE CAYEN, VENTURE CAPITAL IN CANADA, BANK OF CANADA, (2001),
available at http://www.capitalderiesgo.secyt.gov.ar/pdfs/mundo/canada.pdf.

62 Cf. Press Release, National Venture Capital Association, Private Equity Fundraising
Recedes
in
Fourth
Quarter,
(Jan.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nvca.org/pdf/4Q2006Fundraisingfinal.pdf (stating that in 2006 "venture capital
saw the highest fundraising year since 2001 with 200 funds raising $28.5 billion.").

CANADA-UNITED STATES LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 33 No. 1]

think that is a big reason why Canada has become much more like the U.S,
and the borders have become really irrelevant.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: It is really interesting for those people who
look abroad. I tend to look at the world rather than the United States, and I
think what's interesting is that the rollup strategies of specific VC funds that
are industry based are really exciting. I think those are really fun. If you have
got a client or an entrepreneur that is in a specialist industry, rolling up the
industry globally, a specific fund set up for that purpose with no borders
around it can be a good idea.63
If you are working entrepreneurs and you are advising entrepreneurs or
you are looking for money or thinking about money the other way, I would
encourage for you to look for these net-net funds you could pare into an
investment. Co-invest, or look at a broader strategy that has got no borders to
it.
The world doesn't operate any longer with borders, I believe. I think the
way that business and industry works is by looking at the global trend of
rolling up an industry and making the most of it and creating a back office
for it. 64 What I love to do, the investments I am looking at, which interest me
the most, are not only just a rollup of an industry but to roll up the industry
and create a share back office for that industry using technology so that you
have a complete infrastructure that is shared, lowering the cost of that rollup
and leveraging the assets purely upfront.
Does that make sense to everybody? You are actually creating a back
office for the industry. You are rolling up this complete shared services
model and pulling all the SG & A out of the business, and you drop it into
the back office, and then you have an interesting model. That's a great rollup
model.
The funds doing that, if you find businesses you can do that with and
invest in upfront and roll it up with venture money, that's fabulous, but I
don't look at the border stuff any more. I don't think it makes any sense.
MR. SANDLER: Except for the lawyers to some extent, it is up to them
to make those borders and to make it as transparent as possible. That's
difficult in the U.S.-Canada situation.
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MR. CHERNIAK: Practically speaking, the government goes out of its
way to make sure there is a border, running counter to those flows. Canada
has some rather curious laws in my mind that limit American capital going
in. 65 We dealt with them for years in terms of the partnerships and limited
liability corporations.
And that's a very popular structure in the U.S. 66 Venture capital and
private equity funds are structured as partnerships.67 And for whatever
reason, Canada has always had in its mind that they want to limit the ability
of those funds to invest in Canada.6 8 I never understood this; there is no

benefit in my mind.
I am just trying to compress the topic into a very brief statement. I guess it
tends to affect VCs more because at the end of the day there are a lot of ways
around it in terms of having the proper tax advice and doing all the filings
and doing all these sorts of regulatory administrative things we need to do to
make sure that you are on site. 69 All the partners can file tax returns and do
all their certificates and things, but this adds time and cost to transactions,
and the VC - for them it is much more critical because it is a very different
business than the private equity business. 70 The dollars involved are much
smaller, so the administrative and time and cost and risk of these barriers are
much more onerous; they can and do kill venture capital transactions. 71
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Isn't the real barrier that you can't make as
much money? I mean, the deals - and I am going to come back and be my
65 See THOMSON MACDONALD, THE AcTIvITy OF AMERICAN VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS IN
PROSPECTS
(2005),
TRENDS
AND
MARKET:
ISSUES,
ONTARIO
http://204.15.35.174/images/uploads/ThomsonMacdonald1 105.pdf (noting that American
investors state that a range of tax issues arise when engaging in cross-border activity with
Canada resulting in deals becoming too costly or complex).
66 See William L. Megginson, Towards a Global Model of Venture Capital? 12 (The
at
2001),
available
Working
Paper,
of
Oklahoma,
University
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/Megginson.pdf.
67 See id. at 8-9.
68 See generally MACDONALD, supra note 65.
69 See generally id. (discussing that under the Canada-United States Tax Convention,
THE
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70 Id. (stating that despite the Delaware strategy and other methods used to facilitate crossborder activity, investors still see investing in Canadian companies as "complex, timeconsuming and expensive.").
71 Id. (stating that investors interviewed argued that the costs of investing in Canadian
companies "were prohibitive in certain transactions, leading them to consider only those
opportunities where they can make exceptionally large investments in Canada.").
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own devil's advocate - but the perception of the VC opportunity in Canada is
that you just don't have any ROI. The ROI is so much smaller than putting
money at risk in the United States that you just can't drive U.S. dollars into
the Canadian market.7 2
MR. CHERNIAK: Yeah, there are those perceptions.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Saying that, I did two deals in Toronto, so I
am going to make money on those deals, but I chose those deals
specifically.73 I think the perception is you can't make money in Canada.
MR. CHERNIAK: Oh, yeah.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I think there is that whole piece, that, you
know, you cannot put money to - if you put money to work there, you can't
get it to work.
MR. CHERNIAK: No, I agree with you completely. Actually, look at the
20-year return on venture capital in Canada: it is low single digits; and in the
U.S., it is about 20 percent.74 And in the last five to ten years, after the 2000
bubble, those returns converged.75
The five-year U.S. return is low teens if I recall correctly, which is not
bad, better than Canada but not a home run, on average. But by every
measure, one-year, five-year, ten-year, twenty-year, Canada does trail the
U.S. in venture capital returns.76 And one of the reasons, frankly, is that it is a
structural thing. I don't think it is necessarily fundamental to Canadian
companies. It is issues like the labor-sponsored funds, which were
government-incentive vehicles to, for reasons other than pure investment
fundamentals, put capital into the capital markets.77

72

See generally

CAYEN,

supra note 61 (stating that in the Canadian venture-capital

industry there is "a high risk of making little profit or even of incurring losses.").
73

id.

74 See generally Charles Plant, Lightweights in a Heavyweight World, RED CANARY, Aug.
20, 2006, http://www.redcanary.ca/view/lightweights-in-a (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) ("Rates
of return for venture capital investments in Canada for all measurement periods and for all
stages of investing are in single digits or negative."); cf. Press Release, National Venture
Capital Association, Venture Capital Out Performance Holds Steady in Period Ending Q1
2007, (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q107VCPerformanceFINAL.pdf
(stating that the U.S. venture capital twenty year returns of 16.4%).
75 See generally Jim Casparie, Raising Money - Can You Really Land Venture Capital?,
ENTREPRENEUR, Mar. 31, 2006, availableat http://www.entrepreneur.com/money/financing/
raisingmoneycoachjimcasparie/article84246.html (explaining that "when the 'dot corn' bubble
burst and the IPO and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market virtually disappeared" venture
capital firms experienced difficulty receiving a return on their investment).
See generally Plant, supra note 74.
77 See generally Douglas Cumming, FinancingEntrepreneurs:Better CanadianPolicyfor
Venture Capital, C.D. HowE REs. INST., Apr. 15, 2007, 2007 WLNR 9872149 (stating that
Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) are Canada's key venture capital
initiative to facilitate entrepreneurial investment).
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They thought the necessary risk capital to support the entrepreneurial
underbelly of the economy was not going to come from the private sphere, so
they initiated a 30% tax-credit incentive, in order to draw the capital in.78
Every dollar you put in, you get 30 cents back via a tax credit, but the
problem is the labor-sponsored world created specific rules that these funds
had to maintain to keep their status. 79 Well-meaning rules that are, in some
cases, silly. For example, one was called the "pacing rule," which essentially
meant that the government would dictate how quickly you have to spend the
money you raised. And so every November, December typically in the
Canadian capital markets, you have LSIFs running around like drunken
sailors with their wallets open saying, "I've got to spend this money before
year-end. I almost don't care what I do with it. Is it even remotely a
reasonable opportunity? If it is, here you go, take my money because it is
December. I would have turned the deal away in May!" So there is no way to
tell scientifically, but initiatives like these must have hurt returns in the
Canadian markets.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: I think that the statistic here, which you
produced, I thought, was unbelievable. It was very great.
MR. CHERNIAK: Yeah, for ten years.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: Yeah.
MR. CHERNIAK: No. That is skewed by the fact that in the bubble, U.S.
investors were making returns that were just off the charts - "thousand
percent" returns. If you look at the longer five-year or ten-year U.S. return, it
is much more normal.8 So 20 percent is not sort of a stable return, but it is
still, again, big. The U.S. return is better.
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: What would really be interesting actually
would be a study of returns on the specific industry sector funds because, if
you looked at the returns that were specifically from the Canadian cluster, I
bet those returns are fabulous.
So what we have is a mix of all invested monies. I presume that Canada
could have an incredible forestry fund venture or whatever assets are up in
Canada that I am not aware of, if you think about what assets Canada has and
think about how they can be ventured and put into specialist funds and rolled
78 See Ayi Ayayi, Public Policy and Venture Capital: the Canadian Labor-Sponsored

Venture Capital Funds. 42 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT 335 (2004), 2004 WLNR 9619980 (stating

that a benefit to investing in a labor sponsored venture capital fund is a 30-percent tax credit
on the investment).

79 See generally Cumming, supra note 77 (stating that LSVCCs are bound by many

statutory constraints, including "requirements to reinvest fixed percentages of contributed
capital in private entrepreneurial companies within a stated period of time.").
0 See generally Press Release, National Venture Capital Association, supra note 74
(stating that five-year and ten-year returns on U.S. venture capital is 2.7% and 21%
respectively).
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up as a global industry. That's where Canada can make a mark. I mean,
Canada can make a mark by using its asset base to petition for venture funds,
and maybe that's why this is skewed.
MR. SANDLER: Part of the reason why it is skewed is because there is
no breakdown between labor-sponsored funds and private venture funds. 81 I
think the labor-sponsored funds return certain rollups.
MR. CHERNIAK: Yeah, absolutely. I did sort of a rough calculation on
the fly when I was in the business and, absolutely, the overall return for the
labor-sponsored returns is fairly dismal.82
MR. SANDLER: Negative in many cases.
MR. CHERNIAK: Yeah. In some cases, they were specially focused
funds that had shackles that American funds or other sort of generalist
venture capital funds didn't have.83 The one, which I worked with, their
charter was to invest in small, capital intensive, labor intensive businesses in
the province of Ontario. And that was right around the time that the Indian
and Chinese offshore manufacturing assault was hitting its peak. You did the
best you could, but when your focus is that specialized and tragically flawed,
frankly, let's just say that chunk of capital didn't do very well.
MR. SANDLER: That's labor.
MR. CHERNIAK: Yeah.
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF BRAD D. CHERNIAK
AND CATHY HORTON-PANZICA
MR. SANDLER: Aren't there a couple of questions or comments?
DR. KING: Yeah. I had a question. It seems to me the ultimate source of
success or failure is technology, and I would like to ask Cathy and also Brad
about technology reviews.
Do you have somebody on your staff - or do you have a group that
reviews it before you take the plunge or before you take - or do take the
entrepreneur's word for it?
MS. HORTON-PANZICA: It is interesting because my partner, he and I
between us probably have 40 years of tech or technology experience. So we
actually are very deep technologists. Between us, he covers very much
81 See generally Cumming, supra not 77 (arguing that labor sponsored funds "have
become the dominant source of venture capital" in fact, "government tax subsidies to
LSVCCs may crowd out private venture investment.").
82 Id. ("[E]vidence suggests LSVCCs are inefficient investment vehicles, charging high
fees and yielding disappointing results: very few funds generate positive returns.").
83 Id. (explaining that statutory constraints on labor-sponsored venture funds "include
limits on the geographical range of investment opportunities to within the sponsoring
jurisdiction, [and] constraints on the size and nature of investment in any given entrepreneurial
company.").

